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Americans’ adventures in Russia. Garand and M1 «The danger lies within western powers interest in us, after they taim the Russian Tsar and gain control over eastern Europe.” US ambassador to Russia Seimor in his letter to secretary of State William Marcy. It is hard for Russians and US citizens to imagine, that these 2 countries saw each other as «natural allies» most of the modern history period. For instance, soon after being re-elected, president Lincoln called up council for “immediate re-armament of Russian army”. Quite a logical step, bearing in mind that the federal government feared that United Kingdom might take part in the war on the rebel states’ side. Even though the plan developed by this council had never been put into life, the military and technical cooperation between Russia and USA soon took up a large scale. Two rifles, designed by famous civil war hero General H.Berdan, were put in service of the Russian army in the second half of 19th century. Smith and Wesson revolvers had also been supplied to the Russian army and police. The overall number of revolvers ordered form the US was 250 000, that is why the third model became known as the “Russian”. During First Wordl War, Russia became the largest buyer of the Winchester M1895 rifles. John Browning design, adapted to the Russian round, had proven itself reliable in repulsing enemy attacks – the lever action allowed for higher fire rate, compared to the bolt action. The reliability of the M1895 in trenched war turned out to be quite low – the rifle was very sensitive to dirt and low temperatures. Meanwhile its disassembly was far more complicated than the regular Mosin rifle. The USSR seemed to have had prepared much more thoroughly for the next war – the Tokarev SVT rifle had been put into service. The drop in production quality during the war, just like replacing the professional army with somewhat prepared rookies had played its negative part in SVT’s career. After a lot of failure reports from the frontline, the SVT had been put out of production, with just its automatic variant still being supplied as ersatz-machinegun. Nevertheless the Red Army commanders hadn’t stopped dreaming of a semi-automatic rifle. The system of mixed soldiers’ armament – with submachine guns and long rifles, basically made part of the soldiers useless at distances beyond 200 meters. The Mosins were too slow, to do any significant damage to the enemy. The desired semi-automatic guns could be acquired form the USA in terms of Land Lease contract. They only had to find out how good the guns were first. Garand rifle was bought to the test facility of the Main artillery department of the Red Army in July 1943. It is curious, that Garand was not only compared to the Soviet SVT-40 (Tokarev), but also with the German G-41(m) (Mauser). Accuracy was tested first. No. Rifle Sight Distance in meters Groupings radius 100% of all shots (см) 50% best shots (см) 1 7.62-мм semiautomatic Garand rifle (USA) 1,1 3,3 6,6 100 300 600 12,2 28,3 67,7 4,9 11,3 28,7 2 7.92-мм semiautomatic rifle G41(m) (German) 1 3 6 100 300 600 8,0 30,0 83,3 4,2 14,7 34,7 3 7.62-мм semiautomatic Tokarev rifle (SVT-40) 1 3 6 100 300 600 13,4 46,3 94,0 3,8 14,7 27,0 Winchester 1942 rounds were used to fire the Garand. Polish ammo of 1930-ies was used with th German Mauser. The SVT data had been taken form the 1941 report. As it is seen form the table, the American and German rifles had shown better accuracy, than the Russian SVT-40. This had several reasons, according to the report. First of all, the German and the American rifle are heavier than the Russian one by 800 and 600 grams respectively. Second, Garand had dioptrical sights and the line of sight length was the largest among all 3 rifles. Accuracy and comfort of the rifles was determined through carrying out tasks and exercises from the Basic Firearm Course (BFC) by qualified shooters-testers. Their conclusion was the following: 1. The Garand semiautomatic rifle is comfortable and has good accuracy, as all exercises done had marks “excellent” and “good”, except for “satisfactory” for the second shooter in exercise no2. 2. G-41 semiautomatic rifle is uncomfortable and has low accuracy, as there were five “satisfactory”, one “good” and one “excellent” marks, and one “bad” one (meaning 0 hits). The next was determination of practical fire rate at 100-mm target at 100 meters. N Rifle Shooter 1 Shooter 2 Average rate of fire (shots per minute) Number of rounds Time per sec. Number of rounds Time per sec. 1 7.62-мм semiautomatic Garand rifle (USA) 16 16 16 30 31 29 24 24 24 42,5 41,0 45,0 32-34 31-35 33-32 2 7.92-мм semiautomatic G41(m) rifle (Germany) 20 20 20 60 59 63 20 20 20 57 50 55 20-23 20-24 19-22 The high rate of fire of Garand was possible, according to shooters, by the comfort of clip loading, the automatic clip ejection after last shot and the speed of acquiring the target with dioptrical sight. And, obviously, one of the most important parameters, which Soviet soldiers were interested in, was reliability in different environments. N Envorinment 7.92-мм semiautomatic G41(m) rifle (German) 7.62 мм semiautomatic Garand rifle (USA) 7.62-мм semiautomatic Tokarev (SVT-40) rifle Misfires Qty. % Qty. % Qty. % 1 Normal lube parts – – 2 4 3 6 2 Thick lube parts 2 4 – – 5 10 3 Dry parts 3 6 – – 4 8 4 Angle elevation 70-80° – – 1 2 3 6 5 Angle elevation (down) 70-80° – – – – 3 6 6 Rifle and ammo heated up to 70° 3 6 – – 8 16 7 Rifle and ammo cooled down to -50° 2 4 1 2 9 18 8 Dusty rifle with dry parts 20 40 3 6 6 12 Misfires overall 30 7,5 7 1,75 41 9,75 As it is seen form the table, the Garand beat the SVT and the German rifle in terms of reliability. One test out of eight was crucial for it – fired when covered in dust, when there simply was not enough energy in gas for reloading cycle. It seemed that there should have been clear conclusions form these tests – here is THE accurate and reliable rifle for the Red Army. But there were a few other important aspects for the Main Artillery Department. They were mentioned in the end of the test report. “Disassembly, cleaning and maintenance of Garand rifle is more complicated, than the Tokarev rifle and requires more training. For instance, cleaning the barrel with the rod form the muzzle is impossible. In terms of weight, the Garand (4.513kg) and the G41(m) (4.717kg) didn’t meet the modern requirements of the time and are heavier than the SVT-40 by 0.613 and 0.817 kgs respectively.” The second point could be neglected – at the end of the day, the bad experience of the same SVT-40 proved that chasing weight cut at the cost of reliability is not the most reasonable way. But the educational requirements for the soldiers was much more crucial. For many newbies in the Red Army weapon cleaning came down to shaking the sand off the gun after the enemy’s artillery strike. All sorts of different commissions, that visited the front line constantly, reported equipment and tool loss by the soldiers. Though, slowly the soldiers’ education had improved and was no longer tragial by 1943, as it was in 1941, when “soldier is unable to reload due to rusty bolt” was common. The second American system tested at the facility at the same time was M1 Carbine. USSR became interested in it back in 1941, when the Main Artillery Department officers read the results of the tests for lower impulse ammo carbines in “Army Ordnance” magazine. But the idea of creating a new round for the army looked, somewhat, in the worng time in 1941. Besides, the carbines created for the TT round (7.62x25) didn’t show any significant advantages over the existing rifles at that time. As it was immediately pointed out, “the 7.62-mm semiautomatic American M1 carbine is a new type of personal, high manuevarable firearm – for instance, its weight is as low as 2.250 kg.” This time shooting in different environments was the first test. N Environment Number of shots Misfires Ammo stuck in mag Qty misfires % misfires. 1 Normal parts lube 20 – – – 2 Angle 90° (down) 20 – – – 3 Angle 90° (up) 20 – – – 4 Thick lubricant 20 1 1 5 5 Dry parts 20 – – – Overall in different environments 100 1 1 1,0 The accuracy test was also promising. The M-1was competeng with Degtyarev experimental carbine and the captured M.Kv.42(H) by Henkel, which was referret to back then by the Soviets as Automatic carbine. Name 100 meters 300 meters 500 meters Sight 100% of all shots 50% best groups Sight 100% of all shots 50% best groups Sight 100% of all shots 50% best groups 7.62-мм M-1 semiautomatic American carbine Min. 8,4 3,6 Min. 23,5 11,7 Max. 4 shots out of 30 below point of aim by 2-2.1 meters 7,62-мм Degtyrev’s carbine 1 21,7 10,7 3 64,7 31,0 5 131,3 45,0 7,9 мм automatic carbine M.Kv.42(H) by Henkel 1 11,5 5,4 3 30,5 15,2 5 38,3 20,2 The conclusion was disappointing – direct hit ballistics of M-1 turned out to be almost the same as the on of the PPSh. Flat nose bullet had lost energy really fast during the flight. With this kind of results, all the American’s advantages had become pointless, especially when compared to the captured “German” gun. As a result, the M-1 was “recommended for study” to the Russian designers. It was obviously not ordered within the Land Lease contract. USSR was working on making its own intermediate cartridge and a firearm for it full scale in 1943. Andey Ulanov.

Americans’ adventures in the USSR PART 1. Submachine guns Before the start of the Second World War, the goal of developing a new semiautomatic/full auto rifle was the main one in the Red Army. However, research and manufacture of submachine guns was also among major tasks since the 1920ies. It was in the 1920ies that a batch of “Thompsons” was bought in the USA and handed over to the border troops of the Red Army. There is no precise data on its use. However it can be assumed, that “ Chicago Typewriter” showed to be quite effective, since the research and development of soviet submachine guns hadn’t slowed don’t, but on the contrary – were sped up. Moreover, one of the Thompsons participated in the comparison tests of soviet and foreign submachine guns, which took place in 1930. Eventually, in 1934 USSR put into service its own submachine gun – Degtyareva and with this the story of imported submachine guns had temporarily come to an end. However, after the start of the war, the legends of tons of German machinegunners forced the Soviet commanders to start forming their own divisions, fully equipped with submachine guns. Even though the PPSh (Shpagin submachine gun), which was put into service in 1941, was quite simple and technologically acceptable in manufacture, it had a few “narrow places”, interfering with the increase of mass production. The manufacture of an even simpler Sudaev submachine gun had only been started at the end of 1942. In these circumstances, the submachine guns supplied according to the terms of Land Lease were of great help to the Red Army. The major part of supply was still the Thompsons, which normally came as enginery (tanks etc) personell firearms. But being an important anti-nazi ally, “Uncle Sam” was also kept informed of the latest arms research. This is why Resising and the M3 “Grease gun” were also among the guns being tested at the Main Artillery Department test ground. The Thompson submachine gun was tested as a “military” version with a box-type 20-round magazine. Its weight with an empty magazine was 5,125 kg. The test results showed that Tommy gun’s single fire accuracy at 50, 100 and 200 meters was better than the Soviet submachine guns and was almost the same accuracy when firing full auto (short bursts 3-5 shots). Type of fire 50 meters 100 meters 200 meters Thompson PPSh (Shpagin) PPS (Sudaev) Thompson PPSh (Shpagin) PPS (Sudaev) Thompson PPSh (Shpagin) PPS (Sudaev) Single R100 8,2 11,7 14,7 18,2 23,7 22,6 48,5 64,3 52,3 Ч50 3,4 5,5 6,5 8 15,7 9,9 21,3 31,7 23,0 Full auto R100 12,6 – 15,5 29,2 25,3 29,2 82 55,7 60,7 Ч50 6,1 – 7 14,2 13,2 16 29,6 29,7 31,1 Thompson was functioning quite reliably in different conditions. Overall 18 288 rounds were fired through it during the tests with 986 misfires (5.32%). As it was noted by the people involved, the Thompson submachine gun’s automatics was quite sensitive to dirt. In their opinion, Tommy gun was to be cleaned after each 1000 rounds. The design of the gun, even in its simplified “war” version, was acknowledged to be far too complicated and not technological (production-wise). This was also the opinion in the US, where they had launched the development of a simpler and cheaper submachine gun. The feedback by the troops didnt add any optimism: “The Thompson submachine gun is not popular among troops, who prefer the PPSh (Shpagin), fore the Tommy gun has high rate of misfire and is uncomfortable in use. Red Army was supplied with Thompsons on January 7th 1942 and already by January 10th 1942 was massively sent to the workshops due to high misfire. The reason for that was tight bolt action in the receiver (low clearance) and lubricant being stuck on them (most likely – cod liver oil), because it froze at -16 -20 degrees Celsius), just as well as the extra tension against cloth oil seals, which were soaked with the same lubricant (the lubricant was the factory-supplied and came in the gun’s buttstock). There were no cleaning accessories supplied, which gave extra difficulties in use. Round magazine installation on the Tommy gun is uncomfortable and required special skills as there was no magazine stop. The mags were interchangeable. High oxidation (rust) resistance was noted compared to the PPSh. Magazine levers loss and wood stock burns were also common.” The next one at the test facility was the Reising submachine gun. According to reports, it was not put thought the full cycle of tests. Construcstion study showed it to be overall complicated, however some parts – like the delayed blowback and the original trigger group, which functioned as the fire rate slowing mechanism, were highlighted in the report as noteworthy to the Soviet designers. The bolt of the Reising was put through a separate study. Among all the imported guns according to the Land Lease, Reising was the only one with delayed blowback. The conclusion of Soviet officers was the following: “The delayed blowback allowed to reduce the weight of the moving parts, but made the system more complicated overall. It required usage of a special part – relatively complicated bolt carrier. Moreover, due to this fact, the disassembly and especially production of the Reising gun was more complicated, as it took a lot more precision in parts’ manufacture.” The other overseas guest – the M3 Submachine gun was of much more interest. It was known to the Soviet military officials as soon as it was tested, at the special bulletin for the officers of the Main Artillery Department stated that simple and cheap, “British Stan-type submachine gun – the T20 was being researched and developed in the United States. Its was to be used by the partisans and spies.” It showed similar accuracy to the Tommy gun at 50, 100 and 200 meters range. Also, the M3 showed good operation reliability in different conditions. And finally, the stamina test – 12 300 shots were fired prior to the first part breakdown – the spring of reloading mechanism lever and 17 000 shots until the sear broke. The sealing level and dust resistance of the M3, which provided it with the above described level of reliability, was highly rated by the Soviet officers. The Soviet blowback operating guns (the PPSh Shpagin and the PPS Sudaev) down side was the moving parts hitting the receiver end plate. In the M3, according to estimations, the recoil spring absorbed 99.4% of the recoil energy, which led to higher accuracy. It was the perfect result for a war-time simple design. In the conclusion of the test report it was stated: “The M3 submachine gun test carried out in may 1944 showed, that the firearm, put into service in the United States army in may 1943, not only outranks all the previous American submachine guns (Thompson 1923 and 1928, M1 and M1F1, and also Reising), but in terms of its certain qualities can be among world’s best submachine guns.” And finally, we can bypass one of the popular “legends”, related to the usage of American submachine guns by the Red Army. One of the versions, in particular, is written in the memoires of Dmitry Loza, who was one of the Sherman tank operators, supplied according to the Land Lease: “ Each Sherman tank was supplied with 2 Thompson guns. Caliber 11.43mm – huge cartdidge! But the gun was lousy. We had a few incidents. As a bet guys would put on 2 winter jackets, walked a bit away and then Thompsons would be fired at them. The bullet would get stuck in the jackets. That’s how sh..ty the gun was. Whereas we used to appreciate the German folding-stock submachine gun (referring here to the MP-40 made by Erma) for its compact size. Thompson was too big to be carried and used by the tank troops.” It is very unlikely, that Dmitry Loza had personally witnessed these “experiments”, most likely he heard someone’s stories, which he told many years later on his memoires. In reality, the small arms in the USSR were also tested for penetrating power. World War Two times standard penetrating power test was carried out by firing at the wooden package, which consisted of the 25mm thick wooden blocks with 25 mm empty spaces between them. Thompson gun penetrated three wooden blocks with all 10 shots at 50, 100 and 200 meters distance and the next – fourth one, with 9 out of 10 bullets. Even at 300 meters the first wooden block was penetrated by 10 out of 10 shots. Two winter jackets are undoubtedly think, but very unlikely to be more bullet proof than the 1 inch wooden block. However, it is possible, that there was some sense in legends like this one. In the Main Archive of the Ministry of defense of Russian Federation, there is a report on the condition of 3 million of 11.43 mm American pistol ammo, delivered via Murmansk. Initial visual examination showed that the ammo had residue and dirt under the cases, different primer depth and others flaws. The ammo was by different manufacturers and form different dates. The firing test showed the ammo to have had high percentage of defects, most common being the primers, which lead to gas blowback, case explosion, misfires, hard extraction and other abnormalities. Most likely, this “soup” was manufactured before the US factories set up production of military orders. And, obviously, used in combat, this ammo didn’t do any good to the reputation of the Land Lease arms among the Red Army troops. Perhaps, the reason was different – the ballistics of a large, heavy and slow .45ACP bullet. If sight adjustment or hold overs were not perfect, the bullets trivially didn’t even reach the target. The soldiers, after many rounds of misses, having being confident in their good aim, started to think of the bullets being weak. A somewhat similar situation arose in the Korean war, where the landscape features provoked aiming and range finding errors. The soldiers equipped with M1 Garands, which had larger direct shot distance, were less sensitive to these errors, whereas the soldiers with M1 and M2 carbines started legends of the ineffectiveness of the .30 Carbine cartridge against the enemy in thick clothes. As a result , many of the US soldiers became disappointed with the intermediate cartridge. Andrey Ulanov.

Петров, Калашников… и Гаранд. Мнения о том, что основной русский винтовочный (а чуть позже и пулеметный) патрон 7,62х54R стоило бы чем-то дополнить, а то и вовсе заменить, впервые зазвучали уже вскоре после принятия его на вооружение. Занявшись вопросами проектирования самозарядного и автоматического оружия, русское оружейные конструкторы быстро пришли к выводу, что 7,62х54R далеко не самый оптимальный патрон. В частности, занимавшийся созданием автоматической винтовки В.Г.Федоров уже тогда провел расчеты, доказывающие, что более оптимальным был бы патрон калибра 6,5-мм, уменьшенной, по сравнению со штатным, мощности. Но переход на новый патрон и новое же оружие для него требовали слишком больших вложений. Федорову пришлось довольствоваться японскими 6,5-мм патронами, которые Российская Империя закупала в ходе ПМВ вместе с винтовками "Арисака". Споры о необходимости смены патрона велись также и в межвоенный период, и даже после начала Великой Отечественной войны. В частности, у советских оружейных конструкторов вызвала большой интерес информация о разработанном в США "М1 карабин", под уменьшенный, по сравнению со штатным .30-06 патрон. Однако главным и решающим доводом стали захваченные на фронте образцы германских "пулемет-карабинов МкВ-42" – как именовались данные образцы в советской деловой переписке. Специалистам Главного Артиллерийского Управления (ГАУ) занимавшимися вопросами стрелкового вооружения, стало ясно, что если в СССР не будет готов аналогичный ответ, пехота вермахта получит заметное преимущество на поле боя. Поэтому задание как на отработку нового патрона, так и на тяжелый автомат и самозарядный/автоматический карабин под него были выданы очень быстро. Выбор именно этих видов стрелкового оружия был весьма показателен. Дело в том, что по мнение специалистов из ГАУ: "Появление в немецкой армии 7,92-мм автокарабина вызвано отсутствием в немецкой армии хорошего ручного пулемета, и, возможно, желанием найти универсальное огнестрельное оружие пехоты, на замену ручного пулемета и винтовки". Этот вывод отнюдь не случаен – в ГАУ к этому моменту сложилось мнение, что MG-34 тяжел и сложен как ручной пулемет, при этом в роли станкового не способен обеспечить достаточной длительности и интенсивности стрельбы. При этом заменивший его MG-42, как было сочтено, больше "сдвинут" в сторону требований к станковому пулемету – а вот "автокарабин" будет закрывать собой нишу ручного. Интересно, что в чем-то аналогичное мнение высказывали фронтовики, в том числе и в проводимых уже после Победы опросах о стрелковом оружии. По их мнению, автоматов под новый патрон требовалось два-три на отделение, на замену ручным пулеметам. С этой точки зрения представлялось вполне логичным в дополнении к автомату/ручному пулемету заняться также созданием под новый патрон оружия и для остальных солдат в отделении – легкого самозарядного карабина. Помимо прочего, это решение также "подстраховывало" автоматную программу на случай провала или затягивания работ. Одним из тех, кто решил побороться в объявленном ГАУ конкурсе стал и Михаил Калашников. Карабин, в разработке которого принял участие молодой конструктор, в документах обозначается как СККП – Самозарядный Карабин Калашникова и Петрова. Правда, если дотошно придерживаться вопросов приоритетности, то некоторые могут счесть, что к этим двум фамилиям стоило бы добавить и еще одну – американца Гаранда. «Карабин Калашникова и Петрова конструировался и разрабатывался по типу самозарядной винтовки Гаранда, вследствие чего в карабине Калашникова и петрова несколько сборок и механизмов по конструктивному оформлению и принципу действия разработано аналогично самозарядной винтовке Гаранда; например: запирание канала ствола, питание, ударно-спусковой механизм, крепление ствольной коробки. Необходимо отметить, что на НИПСМВО ГАУ КА испытывалось несколько образов с запиранием канала ствола, как это осуществлено в карабине Калашникова и Петрова, например: А) С 24/VI-1932 г. и по 31/XII-1938 г. (протокол № 74) разрабатывалась и испытывалась автоматическая винтовка систему Кедар под патрон обр. 1906 г, запирание канала ствола в которой было осуществлено при помощи поворота затвора на 90 градусов. … б) В декабре 1932 года испытывалась АВ Токарева, запирание канала ствола в которой было осуществлено при помощи поворота боевой личинки на 45 градусов, вследствие чего опорные выступы боевой личинки входили в кольцевой паз ствольной коробки. … в) В декабре 1933 года испытывалась АВ конструкции коллектива ИНЗ-2, запирание канала ствола в которой было осуществлено при помощи поворота затвора по типу винтовки обр. 1891/30 г. Указанная АВ стрельбой не испытывалась – были сняты только конструктивные характеристики. Из приведенного материала следует, что короткое запирание канала, как это осуществлено в СККП осуществлялось и ранее в образцах стрелкового оружия, поэтому оно (запирание ствола в СККП) никакой новизны не представляет." Впрочем, принципиальность новизны конструкции в тот момент мало интересовала испытателей. Гораздо важнее был вопрос, как хорошо стреляет новый карабин, насколько покажет он себя надежным и удобным. Последний вопрос оказался, пожалуй, единственным пунктом, по которому не возникло существенных замечаний – карабин признали удобным при стрельбе из всех положений. Были высказаны замечания по поводу размеров мушки и прорези, отмечена также относительная сложность разборки/сборки, а также плохой доступ для чистки. В отдельный пункт выделили замечание о том, что "неожиданно выпрыгивающая" перед лицом стрелка пустая обойма может "оказывать отрицательное влияние и снижать эффективность и действительность огня при стрельбе из карабина". Впрочем, у Гаранда патронная пачка так же автоматически выбрасывалась после израсходования патронов – и это не помешало ему вполне успешно послужить основным оружием пехоты США во Второй мировой и Корейской войнах. К сожалению для Калашникова и Петрова, на остальных этапах испытаний их карабину повезло меньше. Главной же проблемой стало наличие более опытного конкурента – к моменту испытаний СККП свой образец уже сделал и Симонов. «На равных» соревноваться с опытнейшим конструктором, долгие годы занимавшимся темой автоматических винтовок и карабинов еще под старый винтовочный патрон, было весьма не просто. Характеристики СККП Карабин Симонова Карабин обр. 1944 г. Тактико-технические требования ГАУ Вес карабина со штыком (кг) 4,060 3,660 3,900 Не более 3,8 Вес откатных частей (кг) 0,500 0,450 - Не менее 0,450 Длина карабина со штыком в боевом положении (мм) 1412 1250 1327 1350 То же, со штыком в походном положении (мм) 1112 1000 1020 1100 Длина ствола (мм) 550 500 515 620 Количество деталей и сборок при неполной разборке 6 8 9 –- Число заводских деталей 106 105 –- –- Уже из этой таблицы видно, что карабин Калашникова и Петрова не только проигрывал образцу Симонова, но и по нескольким параметрам не уложился в требования заказчика. При этом конструктивно он был также выполнен заметно сложнее. Хотя число деталей оказалось примерно равным, в отчете об испытаниях было сказано, что конфигурация деталей у СККП для производства более трудоемка, чем у образца Симонова. Это пока еще не было окончательным приговором – технологичность изделия была важна, но при нужде ее можно было «доводить». Следующим этапом стало выяснение кучности боя. На 100 метрах СККП почти удалось уложиться в требования техзадания – 18,3 см. при заданных 18 см. А вот на 300 метров карабин «подкачал» – разлет пуль в мишени уложился лишь в 46,7 см, а по ТТТ для этого рубежа требовалось не более 36 см. Впрочем и ухудшенную кучность тоже еще могли «простить», методы доработки оружия в этом направлении были достаточно хорошо известны. Судьбу карабина Калашникова и Петрова решила болотная вода. После 10 минут лежания в болоте СККП отказал. Это значило провал испытаний на живучесть – общее количество задержек в затрудненных условиях не должно было превышать 2%, получилось же больше 11%. Причины этого в отчете об испытаниях сформулированы следующим образом: «Основной вид задержек – неотражение гильз (9,9%) , что составляет 87,7% к общему числу задержек. Неотражение гильз происходит вследствие неполного отката подвижной системы. Неполный отход подвижной системы происходил вследствие недостаточной энергии при откате. Так, например, велосиметрические исследования работы автоматики показывают, что при густой смазке деталей и разного рода загрязнений при движении происходит значительная потеря энергии затвором от момента конца действия толкателя (поршня) на затвор.» Заключение испытателей было однозначным – карабин Калашникова и Петрова ни по боевым, ни по конструктивных характеристикам не подходит под требования ГАУ КА к новому карабину. Кроме того, СККП также уступил образцам, ранее испытывавшимся на полигоне – в первую очередь, карабину Симонова, будущему СКС. Доработка СККП также была сочтена нецелесообразной, поскольку было очевидно, что фактически потребуется создание новой конструкции. Скорее всего, того же мнения придерживался и сам Михаил Калашников. Молодой конструктор получил очередной урок – в первую очередь о том, насколько важно обеспечение надежности работы автоматики. Равно как и подсказки, о том, как эту проблему решить. А о том, насколько ему это удалось, мир узнал через несколько десятилетий – на рисовых полях Вьетнама. Андрей Уланов.

Kalashnikov submachine gun 1942 (mod 2) By June 22nd, 1941 (the 1st day of World War 2 for Soviet Union, when Nazis began their attempt to invade it) Red Army was equipped with Degtyareva submachine gun (PPD), which was later replaced in production by a more high-tech Shpagina submachine gun (PPSh). The latter was used by the soviet infantry till the end of the World War 2, up to the streets of Berlin with operators’ feedback on the firearm being mostly positive. Nevertheless, apart from infantry, there were many other specialized troops in the army, who didn’t find the heavy submachinegun with fixed wooden stock too handy. Bearing in mind, that with the start of the war soviet soldiers got to know the totally different concept – the German MP-40. Perhaps, the german’s folded stock was mot much of a skull crusher in melee combat, but there were situations, in which compact size was just as important. For instance, one PPSh was assigned to each legendary T-34 tank crew. T-34 deservedly is given high reviews, but not many could call this tank spacious, especially the hatches through which personnel frequently had to leave the tank in emergency. It is of no surprise, that it was the Main Auto-ArmorTank Department, which kept insisting for the Main Artillery Department (the one in charge of firearms development) to come up with a new, more compact and useful submachine gun “similar to the German MP-40”, as soon as possible. As a result, a contest took place in 1942 and was son by Alexei Sudaev’s model of submachine gun. There were many other samples created by participants of the competition and other enthusiasts, however. Among these, was one designed by unknown to anybody back then – sergeant Mihail Kalashnikov. Now a days, there is not much information about the first model made by the future world-famous arms designer. With the prototype being built in a depot of a train station lost somewhere in Kazakhstan, the Kalashnikov submachinegun (PPK) didn’t become the weapon of victory in World War 2 and didn’t survive to present day. Nevertheless, his first creation helped Mihail Kalashnikov get to the place, where his talent was acknowledged and demanded. Long before the World War 2 Research and development of firearms facility of Red Army was not a regular institution dealing in tests of all sorts of guns and machineguns. It had the production capabilities to incarnate “in metal” various projects, it also had its own designers and engineers on site. In particular – the winner of the 1942 submachine contest Alexei Sudaev was among test facility staff. Long before getting to the test facility mentioned above, Mihail Kalashnikov got the opportunity to produce his second (modified version of the first) submachine gun in Moscow institute of aviation, which was evacuated to Almaty, Kazakhstan during the war. This was the model he was introduced with at the test facility with later on. By the time of his appearance at the test facility, the competition for the new submachine gun was coming to its end. 2 almost constructionally-equivalent submachine guns (PPSh-2 Shpagina and PPS Sudaeva) came to the contest final. Which one of them was to be adopted by the military, was to be decided based on battlefield test of the first production series. The end of the contest didn’t, however, mean the end of submachine guns development at the ground. New prototypes kept arriving to the test facility, among which was the model designed by sergeant Kalashnikov. Characteristically, Mihail Kalashnikov did the final modifications to his submachine gun right in the field, just before the tests, these modifications were later separately stated in the certificate of acceptance. In particular, the barrel was replaced by a modified PPSh barrel, adapted for this model, new charging handle was designed and manufactured promptly, trigger uncoupler, spring and several other parts were redone. Factory tests of the new PPK took place form January 30th to February 3rd 1943. During the tests the PPK was compared to already used in the military – PPSh (Shpagina) and with the winner of the earlier contest – the PPS (Sudaeva). Judging by the data in the table below, originally a tank operator Mihail Kalashnikov designed his firearm specifically for his fellow tank personnel, focusing on light weight and compact size. Kalashnikov submachine gun (PPK) Sudaeva submachine gun (PPS) Shpagina submachine gun (mod 1941) (PPSh) 1. Overall weight without magazine (kg). 2,630 2,800 3,640 2. Overall weight with empty magazine (kg). 2,805 3,040 3,920 3. Overall weight with loaded magazine (kg). 3,075 3,420 4,800 4. Overall length unfolded buttstock (mm) 747 905 850 5. Magazine capacity (rounds) 25 35 35 Unlike its competitors, the Kalashnikov submachine gun was built on delayed blowback bolt mechanics. The design turned out to be quite unique: after the shot, the bolt rolled back, shifting the buffer connected to it by rectangular thread. The buffer moved to thread on to a fixed spiral tube, fixed at the back of the receiver, while compressing the recoil spring. The tension of this process slowed down the bolt, reducing the speed of its blowback. The trigger group of the PPK had independent triggers for semi auto and full auto fire. When shooting semi auto, the trigger pushed the uncoupler up, which after the shot under the pressure of the bolt going back, forced the trigger pull and the sear lever to disconnect . For full auto, the selector was set to forward position, deactivating the uncoupler from the process. Kalashnikov submachine gun showed outstanding accuracy when in semi-auto. However the results were completely different, when switching to full-auto short bursts: the grouping was twice as bad as of PPS and PPSh for the distance of 100 meters. According to the report, this was due to 2 factors: 1) the scheme of independent hammer, which struck the primer slightly after the bolt hit the front of the receiver, locking into place after previous shot; 2) relatively fast rate of fire (though slower than the one of the PPSh, but faster than the PPS), combined with low weight of the gun and low effectiveness of the compensator. Likewise, more experienced designer Shpagin had to previously put a lot of effort to tackle similar problem with his PPSh. The reliability of the automatics was tested by a large number of rounds from two different supplies of ammo. After 730 shot a crack was formed at the back of the receiver. This defect was easily eliminated by the lab at the facility by welding a 4 millimeter steel plate on to the back of the receiver, with the firearm returned for testing after. The main problem encountered during the shooting tests was misfire, cause by what the personnel on ground thought, early release of the hammer (12 times per 2280 shots). However, having examined the reports and having heard the designer’s opinion, the specialists at the Main Artillery Department came to a conclusion, that the real reason for misfire was miscalculation of the resistance caused by parts welded onto the spiral tube. The automatics lacked suficiend energy to overcome this extra resistance. This lesson was well learned by the young designer, paying special attention to the reliability of the automatics in future. Overall, the result was not too bad – the maximum percentage of misfire didn’t exceed 3.1%, average of 1.5%. Mass production PPS (Shpagina) of several factories showed much worse results during quarterly repeating tests without any particular “difficult conditions” of production compared to the PPK. Moreover the acceptance commission itself acknowledged that the accuracy and reliability issues of the Kalashnikov could be easily overcome by minor improvements. The uniqueness of the mechanism of the Kalashnikov submachine gun itself was noted, which was a high reward for a beginner designer. However, there was one more very important issue, that normally doesn’t get into the spec sheets and acceptance reports. It was one that Mihail Kalashnikov didn’t give much thought to, while designing his “best” submachine gun, with which it would be quite easy to engage into combat for the tank personnel. “By its constructive design and the technology of manufacture the PPK gave way to the PPS (Sudaeva) and didn’t have advantages over the PP-41. The configuration of PPS parts was such, that they required machine (mostly milling) and locksmithing works. For instance: it took 12 machine working hours by high-qualified staff to make 1 spiral tube for the bolt (7th level of employee qualification), and for finishing it also took to manufacture milling heads and locksmithing tools” As a comparison – according to Main Artillery Department standard at that time, it took 7.3 machine work hours to produce 1 PPSh, with only 2.73 hours for the PPS. With most parts of the PPS being able to be produced at any factory having sufficient stamping machine capability. A somewhat similar story happened at almost the same time in the United States. The main service submachine gun of the US military by the start of World War 2 – the Thompson submachine gun (which also had delayed blowback bolt mechanics and had some exterior similarities with the Kalashnikov submachine gun) was a great firearm, highly demanded by the military. However, even the worlds richest and industrially-developed country, which didn’t have to surrender a significant part of its territory to the enemy and evacuate its factories over thousands of kilometers away from the frontline and set up new production facilities, was initially forced to focus on simplifying and lowering cocsts of production ot the Tommy Gun, and then eventually set up production of simple and cheap M3 “Greaseguns” By winter 1943, after 2 heaviest years of war, USSR simply could not afford to set up production of a better in some ways, but resource-demanding firearm. This is why the Kalashnikov submachine gun was destined to stay a prototype. The experience gained during its manufacture, field tests and modification eventually was of great benefit to Kalashnikov with his production of other models, some of which later to become mass produced and even legendary. But this “thousand “ifs” long” journey started in the depo workshop of Matai station and winter test facility next to Shyurovo in Moscow outskirts. Andrei Ulanov.